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HOW TO BUFFER YOUR WAY OUT OF A 
SCRAPE: POTENTIAL ABUSE OF THE 
CARTOON NETWORK V. CABLEVISION 
DECISION 
INTRODUCTION 
As subscribers to Cablevision Systems Corporation’s (Cablevision)1 
cable service2 are stuck in rush hour traffic or delayed at the doctor’s office, 
a frightening thought might suddenly occur to them: they may miss the new 
episode of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation,3 Aqua Teen Hunger Force,4 or 
Lost5 airing that night. Fortunately, most digital television viewers can 
breathe a collective sigh of relief. The rise of cable television programming 
distribution has brought with it new technologies that allow users to record 
television programming and store these shows for viewing at a later time.6 
The use of digital playback technologies, such as Digital Video Recorder 
(DVR)7 systems and Video on Demand (VOD)8 services, has so pervaded 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Cablevision Systems Corporation is a telecommunications and media company that 
provides various information and entertainment services. About Cablevision, http://www. 
cablevision.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). “Cablevision’s portfolio of 
operations includes a full suite of advanced digital television, voice and high-speed Internet 
services, publishing and interactive media, world-renowned entertainment showplaces, 
professional sports teams, and popular national and regional programming networks.” Id. 
 2. Cablevision provides programming and original content to hundreds of millions of 
American consumers through its “[iO] Interactive Optimum-brand” digital cable service. Id. 
 3. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation is a television drama produced and distributed as part of 
CBS Corporation’s original programming. CBS.com, About CSI, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/ 
csi/about/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 4. Aqua Teen Hunger Force is a popular animated program whose registered copyright is 
owned by The Cartoon Network. Memorandum of Law in Support of Turner’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 3, Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 06 
Civ. 4092) [hereinafter Turner’s Memorandum of Law]. 
 5. Lost is a television mystery serial drama produced and distributed as part of American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc.’s network programming. ABC.com, About Lost, http://abc.go.com/ 
primetime/lost/index?pn=about (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 6. From May 2007 to May 2008 alone, the number of viewers watching programming 
through the use of technology with some form of playback-viewing capabilities rose 35.7%, from 
an estimated 46,632,000 viewers to almost 63,265,000 viewers. THE NIELSEN COMPANY, 
NIELSEN’S THREE SCREEN REPORT 2, 4 (2008) [hereinafter NIELSEN’S THREE SCREEN REPORT] 
(stating that as of May 2008, fourteen percent of all TV tuning in primetime in households with 
Digital Video Recorders (DVR) was through playback of stored programming). 
 7. PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition of: DVR, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_ 
term/0,2542,t=DVR&i=42147,00.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). A Digital Video Recorder, 
“[a]lso known as a ‘personal video recorder’ (PVR) or ‘hard disk recorder,’ a DVR is a consumer 
device” that digitizes broadcast or cable TV onto a hard disk using MPEG-2 compression. Id. It 
allows the viewer to pause at any time and continue to play or record a program for viewing at a 
later date like a VCR. Id. The DVR can also be set to periodically record favorite shows whenever 
broadcast. Id. 
 8. VOD service is provided on an individual customer basis, whereby a cable operator 
receives licensed programming at a central facility and stores it on computer servers so that 
individual customers may view selected programming at any time through the use of a cable 
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the broadcasting industry that the viewing habits of the modern television 
spectator have been drastically changed.9 Consumers may now watch the 
programs they enjoy without the time constraints of real-time viewing. 
These services even allow viewers to pause a television show they are 
currently watching to go have a snack or run an errand, and then 
subsequently resume their program10 with the option of skipping past any 
television commercial advertisements they may find unappealing.11 Despite 
the advantages these technologies provide to consumers, the Remote 
Storage Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) system12 developed by 
Cablevision as a digital playback system13 has caused a great commotion 
amongst those in the media and entertainment distribution industry. The 
prospect of this product’s broad commercial rollout has spurred a large 
number of content providers of movie and television programs to jointly 
bring a copyright suit against Cablevision.14 
On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit handed down its long-awaited 
decision in Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,15 announcing that 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system would not infringe upon the exclusive 
reproduction rights held by owners of copyrighted programming.16  
                                                                                                                 
remote control and an on-screen menu. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon 
Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, 
Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 9. See generally NIELSEN’S THREE SCREEN REPORT, supra note 6. Today, “25% and 35% of 
U.S. homes have DVR and [VOD] respectively. As the number of homes with the ability to time 
shift [their programming] increases, we should expect that people will have more choice of 
television programming available to them and more choice in when to watch.” Id. at 4. 
 10. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 11. See Brian Stelter, A Ruling May Pave the Way for Broader Use of DVR, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
5, 2008, at C8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/media/05adco.html 
(Craig E. Moffett, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Company, said the Cablevision ruling 
could have “seismic implications across the media landscape” which could lead to “a huge 
increase in the number of viewing hours per day potentially subject to ad-skipping.”). 
 12. The RS-DVR system allows cable customers to “record [television] programming on 
central hard drives” without the use of stand-alone DVRs. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). Cablevision stores and maintains these hard drives at a 
“remote” location. Id. Customers may then receive playback of those programs “through their 
home television sets, using only a remote control and a standard cable box equipped with the RS-
DVR software.” Id. 
 13. Id. at 124. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 140. 
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Although the ruling is being hailed by some as a victory for both 
innovation17 and consumers,18 this note argues that the court misapplied 
prior case law19 and ignored the importance of these content-providers’ 
exclusive rights to control the usage and distribution of their copyrighted 
work.20 The Second Circuit employed a short-sighted analysis in 
categorizing data “buffers”21 as transitory carriers of data streams that do 
not produce infringing “fixed copies”22 of copyrighted works.23 The 
decision will likely increase future litigation over whether copyright 
infringement has occurred when data is quickly overwritten24 or obtained 
through the use of buffers. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Gigi Sohn, President of Public Knowledge, a Washington, D.C. based public interest 
advocacy organization dedicated to promoting the public interest in access to information, called 
the decision a “great victory for innovation.” Glen Dickson, Court Says Yes to Network DVR, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout= 
talkbackCommentsFull&talk_back_header_id=6547155&articleid=CA6584154. 
 18. David Ellen, Cablevision’s Executive Vice President and General Counsel, released a 
statement claiming that the court’s decision constituted a “significant victory for consumers.” 
Mark Hamblett, Circuit Backs Remote Recorder Against Programmers’ Lawsuit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 
5, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202423526015. 
 19. Namely, the application of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th 
Cir. 1993), and its progeny; as well as the application of the line of cases following Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights in copyrighted works). 
 21. A Buffer is: 
[A] reserved segment of memory used to hold data while it is being 
processed. In a program, buffers are created to hold some amount of data 
from each of the files that will be read or written. In a streaming media 
application, the program uses buffers to store an advance supply of audio or 
video data to compensate for momentary delays. 
PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition of: Buffer, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/ 
0,2542,t=buffer&i=39017,00.asp [hereinafter Buffer Definition] (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 22. Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006): 
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment 
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A 
work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 
“fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission. 
Id. 
 23. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 24. Litigators will now have the difficult task of determining at what point between 1.2 
seconds and 2 minutes a reproduction arrives at a “more than transitory” state. Law on the Row, 
Second Circuit Gets it Wrong in Cartoon Network v. Cablevision, http://musicattorney.word 
press.com/2008/08/05/second-circuit-gets-it-wrong-in-cartoon-network-v-cablevision/ [hereinafter 
Second Circuit Gets it Wrong] (Aug. 5, 2008, 15:09 CDT). 
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In an already complex battlefield of legal issues, the court’s holding25 
places an even heavier burden on determining where the line between direct 
and contributory copyright infringement liability should attach. The court’s 
reasoning in reaching this decision has further divorced liability for direct 
copyright infringement from intermediary content providers by solely 
attaching this legal responsibility to consumer end-users.26 In order to 
justify its decision, the Second Circuit, dangerously extended the view 
regarding Internet Service Providers (ISPs)27 and Bulletin Board Systems 
(BBSs)28 as passive owners of contributory infringement systems by 
applying it beyond the realm of the Internet.29 
The court’s emphasis on the transitory duration of the copyrighted 
works’ embodiment in the buffers,30 as well as the role of the buffers in 
preventing the copies from being impermissibly “fixed”31 in avoidance of 
direct infringement, may have an impact on a topic debated vigorously on a 
global scale: facilitating the process of “screen-scraping”32 to aggregate data 
for use on a third-party website. While employing screen-scrapers to obtain 
facts and statistics from third-party websites is not typically held to be an 
illegal practice in the United States, many courts consider it to be an 
unethical business practice.33 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (stating that data is not “fixed” in buffers for more than 
a transitory duration where the data resides in such a buffer for no more than 1.2 seconds before 
being overwritten). 
 26. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 13. 
 27. An Internet Service Provider is “an organization that provides access to the Internet. 
Connection to the user is provided via dial-up, ISDN, cable, DSL and T1/T3 lines.” PCMag.com, 
Encyclopedia Definition of: ISP, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=ISP&i= 
45481,00.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
 28. A BBS is “[a] computer system used as an information source and forum for a particular 
interest group. A BBS functions somewhat like a stand-alone Web site, but without graphics. 
However, unlike Web access via one connection to the Internet, each BBS had its own telephone 
number to dial up.” PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition of: BBS, http://www.pcmag.com/ 
encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=bulletin+board&i=38485,00.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 29. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 30. Id. at 127. 
 31. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “fixed”). 
 32. Screen-scraping (or “scraping”) is the process of 
[a]cquiring data displayed on screen by capturing the text manually with the 
copy command or via software. Web pages are constantly being screen 
scraped in order to save meaningful data for later use. In order to perform 
scraping automatically, software must be used that is written to recognize 
specific data. 
PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition of: Screen-Scraping, http://www.pcmag.com/ 
encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=screen+scraping&i=50921,00.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009); see 
also infra Part IV. 
 33. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (permitting suit to be 
brought for potential harm to Register.com’s computer systems through use of the screen-scraping 
program); American Airlines, Inc. v. Farechase, Inc., Cause No. 067-194022-02 (Dist. Ct. Tex. 
Mar. 28, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/AA_v_FareChase/20030310_prelim_ 
inj.pdf (permitting plaintiff to seek temporary injunction against Farechase for, in part, 
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This note is divided into five parts. Part I highlights the differences 
between stand-alone DVR systems and Cablevision’s RS-DVR system. Part 
II describes the court’s key holdings in the Cartoon Network case, namely 
finding that the use of buffers in the RS-DVR system to produce 
reproductions of a “transitory duration” are not capable of infringing 
directly. Part II also explains the court’s conclusion that it is end-users, and 
not the cable provider, that supply the volitional conduct necessary for 
direct copyright infringement liability. Part III examines the court’s 
misguided logic in allowing systems employing buffers to escape 
culpability as direct infringers, and proceeds to describe the dangers of 
extending the Netcom volition test beyond the relative confines of Internet 
services. Such judicial methodology allows for an adequate inquiry into 
who is making the unauthorized copies without exploring why. Finally, Part 
IV and V demonstrate how the Second Circuit’s decision may aid providers 
of screen-scraping programs to avoid direct infringement liability by 
utilizing buffers to engage in the questionably unethical practice of data 
extraction and aggregation. This note concludes by stressing the need to 
reign in the court’s jurisprudential view granting the nearly blanket status of 
buffers as a non-infringing technology. 
I. ARE ALL DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDERS CREATED EQUAL? 
A. HOW DVRS WORK 
In order to better understand the court’s erroneous reasoning in this 
case, it is essential to understand the basics of how a standard “set-top 
DVR” device34 works in contrast to how Cablevision’s RS-DVR system 
operates. Basically, set-top DVR devices, or Personal Video Recorders 
(PVRs),35 are in-home consumer machines that allow cable subscribers to 
record programming, store the copied program on the internal hard drive, 
and play it back at a later time at the user’s request.36 These devices operate 
much like a Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) does with videotapes.37 
                                                                                                                 
unauthorized screen-scraping of American Airlines website for a commercial purpose). See, e.g., 
News Release, Ryanair, Bravofly Ltd Discontinues Screenscraping Ryanair.com: Ryanair to 
Cancel All Screenscraper Bookings (May 8, 2008), available at http://www.ryanair.com/ 
site/EN/news.php?yr=08&month=aug&story=reg-en-050808) (Howard Millar, CFO of Ryanair, 
categorizing screen-scraping activity of Ryanair’s fare prices as “anti-consumer activity”); see 
also infra Part IV.A–B. 
 34. Set-top DVR devices are cable boxes, often offered by cable operators themselves, that 
have DVR digital playback technology embedded within them. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, 
supra note 4, at 6. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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But how does one’s favorite episode of “The Simpsons”38 get from the 
content provider to a consumer’s DVR box for playback? Television signals 
used to be sent primarily in analog broadcast form, transmitted as a series of 
continuous waves.39 In order to provide more channels of programming to 
subscribers, programming distributors have increasingly moved towards the 
use of digital cable broadcasting that delivers these encoded signals in 
digital form.40 One major difference between broadcast television and cable 
transmission is that under the digital cable delivery system, traditional 
analog signals are converted into compressed digital signals41 and 
transmitted to cable subscribers.42 
The delivery of these digitized data streams begins with content owners 
sending feeds (data streams containing the shows that we know and love) to 
one of the cable provider’s central facilities, which aggregates all the 
programming feeds into one large stream of data.43 After the real-time cable 
television programming (or “linear network programming”)44 is sent from 
the content providers to a cable operator, the cable company 
instantaneously transmits the programming feed directly to subscribers.45 It 
is important to note that the program data is only converted into packets of 
data at the central facility so that programs may be tagged with “program 
identifiers,”46 which in turn allow the subscribers’ cable boxes to decode the 
signal when received.47 Because this data passes through the cable 
company’s hardware pursuant to negotiated and statutorily-mandated 
licensing agreements between the content owners and the cable provider,48 
                                                                                                                 
 38. The Simpsons is an animated program whose registered copyright is owned by The FOX 
Broadcasting Company. FOX Broadcasting Company, The Simpsons, http://www.thesimpsons. 
com/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 39. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Compressed analog signals are analog signals that have been digitized and compressed 
spatially, taking up less bandwidth per channel, as well as temporally. MICHAEL MILLER, HOW 
HOME THEATER AND HDTV WORK 28 (Greg Wiegand et al. eds., Michael Troller Illustrator, 
2006). This type of compression allows cable companies to transmit 10 digital channels into the 
same bandwidth (6 MHz) of one traditional analog broadcast channel. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Twentieth Century, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610–11. 
 44. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 3. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Twentieth Century, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610. 
 47. MILLER, supra note 41, at 29. 
 48. Twentieth Century, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610. This type of content distribution, as well as 
content supplied to cable operators for use in VOD services, is governed by licensing affiliation 
agreements entered into between suppliers of copyrighted programming and the cable operators 
broadcasting this material. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 4. 
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no unlicensed copies are made or stored while the data is being aggregated 
and encoded at this central facility.49 
Once the encoded signal reaches a consumer’s PVR tuner,50 the signal 
is sent to both an internal hard drive to record and store programming, and 
an MPEG-251 decoder to convert the signal back to analog so that the signal 
may be sent to the television52 for the subscriber’s viewing pleasure. The 
television watcher at home determines which shows to record and sets the 
PVR accordingly through the use of an on-screen programming guide.53 
This data is stored on the internal hard drive, similar in operation to a hard 
disk on a personal computer,54 and the recorded material remains available 
for the cable subscriber to play back at any time.55 
B. THE RS-DVR SYSTEM’S UNIQUE OPERATION 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system provides digital video playback through 
a different means than that employed by standard PVRs.56 The RS-DVR 
system allows customers to record cable programming on hard drives 
housed and maintained by Cablevision at a central location without the use 
of a set-top PVR box.57 All that is required of consumers to play back 
recorded content through a home television set is the use of a standard cable 
box equipped with RS-DVR software and a remote control.58 
These systems diverge at the point when the various broadcast 
television and cable channels, which provide programming content, 
transmit their television programs as signals to cable companies such as 
Cablevision.59 Instead of adhering to the typical process of aggregating all 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Under this type of system, all transmission activities are governed by licensing agreements 
between the cable company and the providers of the copyrighted programs. Turner’s 
Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 5. 
 50. MILLER, supra note 41, at 29. 
 51. MPEG stands for Moving Pictures Experts Group. PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition 
of: MPEG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=MPEG&i=47295,00.asp (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2009). An MPEG is “an ISO/ITU standard for compressing digital video. 
Pronounced ‘em-peg,’ it is the universal standard for digital terrestrial, cable and satellite TV, 
DVDs and digital video recorders (DVRs).” Id. MPEG-2 provides broadcast quality video and is 
used as the compression standard for DVD information, as well as digital television. Id. 
 52. Jonathan Strickland & James Bickers, How DVR Works, http://electronics. 
howstuffworks.com/dvr1.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing how a basic digital video 
recorder receives television signals). 
 53. MILLER, supra note 41, at 167. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 56. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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the programming feeds into one large stream of data in preparation of 
transmission to viewers’ individual homes,60 Cablevision’s RS-DVR system 
splits the linear network data stream into two separate data streams.61 One 
stream is broadcasted immediately to customers,62 while the other stream is 
channeled into a device called the Broadband Media Router (BMR) which 
buffers the data stream, then reformats it before sending it to a remote data 
server (the Arroyo Server).63 
After the entirety of this second stream of data moves into the first 
buffer (the “primary ingest buffer”), the server automatically checks if a 
customer has scheduled a recording of any particular program.64 If such a 
request has been made by a subscriber, the data flows into a secondary 
buffer, and then onto an individual hard disk allocated for that specific 
customer where a copy is stored for customer playback.65 Irrespective of 
whether a copy has been requested by a subscriber, the BMR holds at most 
1.2 seconds of programming time,66 and the primary ingest buffer 
overwrites the data occupying this buffer every 0.1 seconds.67 The steps in 
this process subsequent to the splitting of the signal into a second data 
stream are not present in set-top DVRs, since the stand-alone machines 
conduct this recording function once the media has already been transmitted 
to individual cable subscribers.68 
II. KEY HOLDINGS IN THE CARTOON NETWORK CASE 
In Cartoon Network L.P.v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,69 a multitude of content 
providers and copyright owners70 brought action against cable television 
operator Cablevision71 in an attempt to enjoin the commercial release of 
Cablevision’s new RS-DVR system to consumers.72 The plaintiffs claimed 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 61. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 62. See Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 3; see also supra text accompanying 
note 45. 
 63. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 125. 
 67. Id. at 124. 
 68. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 69. 536 F.3d at 124. 
 70. Id. at 121. Plaintiffs in this lawsuit included a large number of content providers that 
included movie picture production companies such as Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 
Paramount Pictures Corporation, and Disney Enterprises, as well as television network entities 
such as CBS Broadcasting, NBC Studios, and Cartoon Network. Id. 
 71. Id. Cablevision’s operating company, CSC Holdings, Inc., was also named as a defendant 
in this suit. Id. 
 72. Id. at 124. 
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that the operation of this system would cause direct infringement of their 
copyrights by producing unlicensed copies of works stored in the RS-DVR 
buffers.73 Since all data automatically flowed through the primary ingest 
buffer, plaintiffs alleged that the data stream that passed through this buffer 
created infringing copies, regardless of whether customers scheduled a 
recording (that is, regardless of whether consumers initiated any copying of 
the works).74 
The Second Circuit announced three key holdings addressing the three 
ways in which Cablevision allegedly directly infringed on the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted programming.75 First, the court held that per the provisions of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, in order for a reproduction to be deemed an 
infringing “copy,”76 it must not only embody a “tangible medium of 
expression,”77 but also satisfy a “duration requirement”78 of being 
permanent or stable for “a period of more than transitory duration.”79 
Cablevision’s use of buffers rapidly and automatically overwrites all 
processed programming data within 1.2 seconds.80 This immediate 
overwriting of portions of the copyrighted works contained in the data 
stream prevents these reproductions from becoming “copies”81 and thus 
their unauthorized creation does not constitute direct infringement.82 
Secondly, the court ruled that although Cablevision’s hard drives would 
contain unauthorized fixed copies of the copyrighted programming, 
Cablevision would not incur liability for direct copyright infringement for 
storing these copies on its server.83 The Second Circuit adopted the 
“volitional conduct” standard84 set forth by the Northern District of 
California in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services85 which requires a volitional act on the part of a 
passive owner of an electronic facility in order for direct copyright 
infringement liability to attach.86 Here, the court viewed the volitional 
conduct associated with making the copies as from the individual acts of 
Cablevision’s customers.87 Cablevision itself was regarded as a passive 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 125. 
 74. Id. at 127. 
 75. Id. at 126. 
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “copies”). 
 77. § 101 (defining “fixed”). 
 78. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127 (quoting Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.02[b][3], at 8-32 (2007). 
 79. Id. (quoting § 101 (defining “fixed”)) 
 80. Id. at 124. 
 81. § 101 (defining “copies”). 
 82. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
 83. Id. at 133. 
 84. Id. at 131. 
 85. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 86. Id. at 1370. 
 87. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133. 
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owner88 since its RS-DVR system responding automatically to users’ 
scheduling of recordings.89 
Lastly, the Second Circuit addressed the legality of Cablevision’s 
retransmitting of the stored programming from the cable company’s remote 
location into the homes of individual viewers.90 The court decided that 
despite the “time-shifting”91 of the copyrighted programming and 
transmission to many individual subscribers, Cablevision’s system does not 
infringe on the plaintiffs’ public performance rights.92 The RS-DVR system 
allows customers to produce a single unique copy on Cablevision’s hard 
drives for playback, transmissions of which do not constitute performances 
“to the public”93 and thus do not infringe on the plaintiffs’ copyrights.94 
In bringing this action, the plaintiffs had alleged only theories of direct 
copyright infringement based on their exclusive rights to reproduce and 
publicly perform their works, but did not raise claims of contributory 
infringement.95 In analyzing the arguments, the court was careful in its 
attempt to make a determination by addressing the sole legal claim of 
whether direct infringement by Cablevision had occurred.96  The 
defendants, on the other hand, waived any fair use97 defense98 most likely 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 133. The court did state that Cablevision may have been liable for contributory 
copyright infringement but did not address the claim since plaintiffs did not allege such a theory. 
Id. at 124, 133. 
 89. Id. at 131. 
 90. Id. at 139. 
 91. Time-shifting is “record[ing] a video or audio program when it is broadcast and watch[ing] 
it at a later time.” Buffer Definition, supra note 21. 
 92. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139. 
 93. Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006): 
To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means (1) to perform or display it at 
a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is 
gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or 
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by 
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
Id. 
 94. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139. 
 95. Id at 124. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Fair Use is defined as: 
A reasonable and limited use of a copyrighted work without the author’s 
permission . . . . Fair use is a defense to an infringement claim, depending on 
the following statutory factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the work used, and (4) 
the economic impact of the use. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (7th ed. 1999). 
 98. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
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due to the high probability that the economic nature and market impact of 
their actions would preclude this defense for Cablevision.99 
III. THE COURT’S MISPLACED REASONING REGARDING 
BUFFER COPYING100 
A. DECONSTRUCTING THE BUFFER LOGIC 
In reaching its decision and absolving Cablevision of any liability for 
direct copyright infringement incurred through the ownership and 
maintenance of its RS-DVR service, the Second Circuit first turned its 
focus to whether buffering data that contains copyright works constitutes 
the reproduction of a “fixed copy” as defined in the United States Code.101 
Since copyright holders have the sole right to reproduce their works “in 
copies,”102 the court sought to answer the threshold question of whether the 
reproductions, assuming arguendo that these copyrighted works were 
reproduced through Cablevision’s volitional conduct,103 constituted 
“copies” as defined in the Copyright Act and thus should have been 
subjected to the infringement scrutiny in the first place.104 According to the 
language of the Copyright Act, direct infringement occurs when a “copy” of 
the material is made “in which a work is fixed by any method . . . from 
which the work can be . . . reproduced.”105 The court correctly recognized 
that if the buffer data containing the copyrighted work is not “fixed,” then 
an infringing “copy” has not been produced.106 This means that even if a 
copy is made (according to its colloquial meaning), the reproduction might 
not be a statutorily prohibited “copy” in violation of the Copyright Act if 
the plaintiff does not meet the burden of demonstrating that this 
reproduction also was “fixed.”107 
In conducting its analysis of this issue, however, the Second Circuit 
utilized an abbreviated version of § 101 of the Copyright Act,108 whereby it 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Posting of Solveig Singleton to IPCentral Weblog, http://weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/ 
2007/07/more_cablevisio.html (Jul. 25, 2007, 19:47 EST). 
 100. For a helpful discussion of the possible policies behind the Second Circuit’s decision and 
supplemental analysis of the “fixation” and “volition” requirements, see Megan Cavender, RS-
DVR Slides Past Its First Obstacle and Gets the Pass for Full Implementation, 10 N.C. J. L. & 
TECH. 145 (2008). 
 101. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127 (stating that proof of infringement on a copyright 
holder’s reproduction rights requires a showing that the works were “reproduce[d]” in “copies” as 
defined by § 106(1)). 
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
 103. See brief discussion supra Part II and discussion infra Part III.C–D. 
 104. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127. 
 105. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 106. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127. 
 107. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
plaintiff’s must prove that “copies” are indeed “fixed” per the definitions provided in § 101 in 
order to hold defendants liable for direct copyright infringement). 
 108. § 101. 
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misinterpreted the statute’s provision.109 The Court condensed the 
provision110 to read: “a work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to 
be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”111 
When read in this shortened form, the court erroneously construed the 
language as requiring the embodiment of the copy to remain for longer than 
a transitory duration.112 This essentially means that despite Cablevision’s 
concession that the data contained in the buffers exists for a long enough 
period of time to make a reproduction,113 merely because the embodiment is 
ephemeral enough to be considered “transitory” the court deemed the 
reproduction as falling short of what the Copyright Act defines as a “fixed 
copy.”114 In contrast, the provision should have been interpreted to indicate 
that a work is “fixed” if the copies (here, the data being buffered in the 
BMR)115 are embodied in a sufficiently permanent state that allows the 
copyrighted work to be communicated or reproduced (i.e., the data 
containing the programming being reproduced in the primary ingest 
buffers)116 for a period of more than transitory duration. In other words, 
according to the latter interpretation rejected by the court, the requisite 
period of more than transitory duration is met if the embodiment persists 
long enough for Cablevision to generate a reproduction or communication 
from them.117 Thus, Cablevision would likely have been found liable for 
producing impermissible fixed copies if these proper infringement criteria 
were applied. 
So, why should we care if these buffer copies are excused from liability 
for directly infringing on copyrighted material? Should heed be paid to the 
assertion that we must pardon this use of buffers, since a vast amount of the 
technologies we use in our everyday life need to create fleeting and 
temporary buffer copies to function?118 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Second Circuit Gets it Wrong, supra note 24. 
 110. § 101; see also supra text accompanying note 22 (complete definition of “fixed” pursuant 
to § 101). 
 111. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127 (emphasis in original) (citing § 101). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 129. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. The Copyright Act is properly interpreted in the case to denote that as long as a copy may 
be perceived, reproduced, or communicated, either directly or indirectly (directly by human eyes 
or indirectly with the aid of a machine or device), the unauthorized creation of such a copy may 
constitute an infringement of the copyright holder’s ownership rights. Haochen Sun, 
Reconstructing Reproduction Right Protection in China (pt. 2), 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
223, 270 (2006). 
 118. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Counterclaimants-
Appellants and Reversal, at 18–19, Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-1511-cv(CON)) (stating that the Copyright Act should not 
be interpreted to allow for potential infringement liability for the use of all devices that make 
2010] How to Buffer Your Way Out of a Scrape 151 
B. EFFECTS ON EVERYDAY USERS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY 
To address the latter question, if copies made through the use of 
buffered data were indeed deemed “fixed” and subject to direct 
infringement charges, it is unlikely that end-user consumers would be found 
liable for playing a song on their iPod or operating a digital phone despite 
their necessary use of buffers.119 The transitory Random-Access Memory 
(RAM) copies created in this manner would in all likelihood be defensible 
based on the fair-use doctrine.120 
Courts evaluate the affirmative defense of fair use121 according to four 
factors stated in the Copyright Act.122 Although none of these four factors 
are dispositive in determining whether fair use may be successfully 
applied,123 meeting the criterion regarding “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”124 is the most 
persuasive of the four statutorily enumerated fair-use factors.125 Because of 
this weighted view, courts would not attach liability to average users 
engaged in noncommercial activities who are utilizing 
buffer-necessary technology for personal use, where the owner of the 
copyright is not likely affected financially by (nor likely even aware of) 
most of these daily occurrences.126 The likeliness that this consumer-
friendly outcome would come to fruition under the above circumstances is 
further buttressed by the Supreme Court’s employment of an “equitable rule 
of reason” analysis, which allows more flexibility in deciding which other 
factors may be deemed acceptable purposes regarding a fair use 
determination.127 For example, the Supreme Court has criticized the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals for not allowing “entertainment” or “increased 
access” to new technology to be considered acceptable purposes within the 
                                                                                                                 
transient RAM reproductions, such as computers, CD players, iPods, digital phones, and 
television, or any other digital information-processing device). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?, 56 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 63–65 (2005) (describing how stand-alone DVR and similar device usage 
is generally protected from direct infringement by a fair-use defense). 
 121. See BLACK’S, supra note 97 (listing the four statutory factors to be included for 
consideration in evidencing a showing of fair use). 
 122. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
 123. Id. at 448–49. 
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
 125. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (characterizing the commercial fair-use 
factor as “central fair use factor”); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 448–49 (stating that although not 
conclusive, the first factor to be considered in a fair use analysis is the commercial character of an 
allegedly infringing activity). 
 126. Snow, supra note 120, at 63–65, 67 (2005) (stating that this highly influential fair-use 
factor will likely be met where the purposes for using the copyrighted work are noncommercial 
and incentives for creative efforts are not hindered). 
 127. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. 
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scope of the fair use allowance,128 explaining that not every fair use must be 
productive in nature.129 
C. EXTENSION OF THE VOLITION TEST IN DIRECT INFRINGEMENT 
CASES 
Consumer end-users and providers of systems that utilize buffers 
should not have to rely on a determination of the applicability of the fair use 
doctrine to avoid liability for direct infringement. Perhaps the courts could 
arrive at a more appropriate solution by realizing the important distinction 
between digital systems that use buffers to incidentally make reproductions 
in providing non-infringing services, and those systems that use buffers 
primarily in making reproductions to disseminate copyrighted material.130 
This solution would not require the courts to impose blanket liability on the 
use of all buffers making digital reproductions, placing the burden on 
defendants to invoke a proper defense.131 Instead, it would compel the 
courts to make a determination of infringement liability for the use of 
buffers by placing greater weight on the system providers’ intentions to aid 
in spreading copyrighted material. In this way, direct infringement claims 
involving the use of buffers could be decided with an eye to discerning 
whether the core purpose of the system provided was to create unauthorized 
reproductions, as opposed to those acting as passive agents (which may 
merely allow for the possible facilitation of end-users’ infringing 
activity).132 Adoption of this method necessitates initially looking at the 
level of how passive a given system is in each case, in order to discover 
who is actually making these unauthorized copies: the end-user consumer 
or the host who maintains and creates this digital technology.133 Otherwise 
stated, before the courts can address why the providers of these systems are 
creating copies, it needs to deal with who is producing these copies.134 
One of the difficulties the court faces in making a determination of 
direct copyright infringement liability, as opposed to contributory liability, 
is deciding who was responsible for reproducing the works in question 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), 
rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 129. Matthew W. Bower, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRs: Introducing 
TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 432 (2002) (discussing the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding fair use as a defense against infringement allegations where defendants 
have engaged in television program time-shifting). 
 130. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 15. 
 131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (stating that fair use is an 
affirmative defense and accordingly the defendant bears the burden of proof in asserting such a 
defense). 
 132. Turner’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 4, at 15–16 (describing the non-passive nature 
of Cablevision’s RS-DVR service). 
 133. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130–33 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 134. Id. 
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when end-users are provided access to copyrighted works from a service 
provider.135 In copyright infringement cases, determining who made 
unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted work is usually the least of the 
court’s problems.136 The outcome of the case normally rests on a finding of 
whether the activity engaged in by the accused party substantively 
constitutes an allegedly infringing act, rather than identifying the 
appropriate party to whom liability should attach.137 The additional problem 
of determining who actually created an infringing copy frequently arises 
and has greater relevance in cases such as Cartoon Network, where end-
users or customers engage in potentially infringing conduct by utilizing 
defendants’ systems to create a copy.138 Since the plaintiffs were alleging 
only charges of direct copyright infringement and not contributory 
infringement, the Second Circuit’s analysis of which party was supplying 
the requisite volitional conduct was a key issue in deciding where the blame 
should be placed.139 In order to be found accountable for direct 
infringement, a party must have provided the volitional conduct in making 
the reproductions.140 
Slowly, courts have adopted this “volition test,” applying it through a 
line of cases141 beginning with Religious Technology.142 In Religious 
Technology, a Bulletin Board System operator and Internet access provider, 
Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc. (Netcom), were excused 
from liability on a direct copyright infringement claim when a former 
minister of Scientology turned critic of the religion, Dennis Erlich, posted 
portions of late Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard’s works on a 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 136. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1367–68 (determining whether defendant 
ISP or third-party customer who posted copyrighted work created a “copy” when work was posted 
automatically); see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383–84 
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (weighing the issue of whether copy shops were liable for direct 
infringement when unauthorized copies are made at the behest of requesting customers); 
RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 776–77 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(discerning whether to attach direct liability to customers or to businesses who allowed these 
customers to use in-house equipment to copy sound recordings). 
 139. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124, 130. 
 140. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (stating that although contributory infringement 
may still attach, direct copyright infringement requires a showing of a causal or volitional element 
in producing unauthorized copies beyond mere ownership of a machine facilitating third-party 
reproductions). 
 141. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 142. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361. 
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Usenet143 BBS.144 The plaintiffs, copyright holders of Mr. Hubbard’s 
works,145 sued in response to Netcom’s refusal to comply with their request 
that Erlich not be allowed to gain access to the Internet through the access 
provider’s system.146 Netcom asserted that it would be impracticable to 
prescreen a user’s BBS postings and that they were not responsible for 
creating the unauthorized reproductions. In addition, Netcom argued that 
they were merely providing its subscribers with access to a system that third 
parties might possibly utilize to make copies.147 The District Court for the 
Northern District of California proceeded to expound the newfound 
principle that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, there should 
still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”148 
Thus, the court excused from direct infringement liability those entities that 
provide access to and maintain systems which possess a certain degree of 
“passivity,” where the systems are conduits for the volitional conduct of 
potentially infringing end-users.149 
Prior to the decision in Cartoon Network,150 courts primarily used the 
“passivity test” in determining direct infringement liability only in cases 
where the defendant was an ISP, BBS operator, or provider of some other 
type of web-based service.151 However, the Second Circuit has extended 
this principle to apply outside of this framework by allowing Cablevision, a 
digital cable operator, to escape culpability as a direct infringer.152 The 
court viewed Cablevision simply as a provider of the RS-DVR service and 
data stream buffers, which are conduits for the end-user subscribers’ 
                                                                                                                 
 143. A Usenet (or User Network) is “[a] public access network on the Internet that provides 
group discussions and group e-mail. It is a giant, dispersed bulletin board that is maintained by 
volunteers who provide news and mail feeds to other nodes.” PCMag.com, Encyclopedia 
Definition of: Usenet, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Usenet&i= 
53545,00.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 144. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1365–66, 1372. 
 145. Id. Plaintiffs in this case were Religious Technology Center (RTC) and Bridge 
Publications, Inc. (BPI) who held copyrights in the unpublished and published works of L. Ron 
Hubbard, the late founder of the Church of Scientology. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1366. 
 147. Id. at 1368–70. 
 148. Id. at 1370. 
 149. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131–33 (2d Cir. 2008) (briefly 
discussing the history of the volition test and its application), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 150. See generally id. 
 151. See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (Internet search 
engine operator defendant); see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 
2004) (ISP defendant); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (age verification web-service defendant); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 
923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (BBS operator defendant); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (ISP and BBS defendants). 
 152. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121. 
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requests to record programs and create infringing copies.153 In doing so, the 
court labeled the cable provider as merely maintaining a passive system that 
lacks the requisite volitional conduct necessary to be deemed a direct 
infringer.154 This broadened view of passive system operators will have 
negative consequences for owners of copyrighted materials attempting to 
safeguard their exclusive proprietary rights. Such ramifications may persist 
if the courts rely upon this more widely interpreted passive system analysis, 
which names end-users as sole suppliers of the volitional conduct. Applying 
the volition test in this way may prevent copyright holders from pursuing 
litigation against entities who are both more efficiently enjoined from 
facilitating infringement and more easily identifiable as the true creators of 
the unauthorized copies.155 
D. PUTTING ASIDE THE VOLITION TEST WHEN A BUFFER’S SOLE 
FUNCTION IS TO INFRINGE 
An alternative (and arguably better) approach would require that courts 
look past this relatively new volition element in direct infringement cases 
involving buffers such as Cartoon Network, where the sole purpose of the 
technology is to provide a means to create unauthorized reproductions of 
copyrighted works.156 This proposed jurisprudential view should be adopted 
because prior case law has specifically limited application of the Netcom 
passivity defense to cases where the digital services at issue did not create 
unauthorized reproductions as their primary raison d’être, but rather as 
incidental to providing a non-infringing service.157 
The Second Circuit in Cartoon Network dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
argument that to allow Cablevision to provide the RS-DVR service is to 
allow it to directly profit from the reproduction of unauthorized works by 
providing subscribers with a commercial service geared towards facilitating 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 133. 
 154. Id. at 131 (stating that the Netcom passivity test applies in the current case and transcends 
the Internet). 
 155. Access providers of information and digital works have historically made for more 
attractive defendants, due in part to the relative ease of identifying them relative to end-users. See, 
e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for 
Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 26 (2006). 
 156. It is important to note here that the Second Circuit stated in Cartoon Network that through 
the use of the RS-DVR service, indeed, someone is directly infringing on the plaintiff’s copyright. 
536 F.3d at 130. The court said that “after an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and 
that program airs, a copy of the program-a copyrighted work-resides on the hard disks of 
Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is 
who made this copy.” Id. Without the court’s view of Cablevision’s RS-DVR service and buffer 
components as passive systems, it would follow that end-users were not the ones making copies of 
these works and thus direct liability would almost certainly attach to Cablevision’s actions. 
 157. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Playboy Enters, Inc. v. 
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
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copyright infringement.158 In ignoring this assertion, the court failed to 
recognize principles established in pioneering cases distinguishing 
Netcom159 on the basis of the nature of the defendant as a provider of 
systems whose functions are dedicated solely to aiding in the creation of 
unauthorized copies.160 Cablevision’s data stream buffers are dedicated 
exclusively to aiding consumers in creating copies of programs,161 yet the 
cable company has escaped direct liability.162 
While the Supreme Court has recognized that an entity commits 
contributory infringement “by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct 
infringement,”163 the case law is relatively sparse regarding when the line 
has been crossed in facilitating third-party infringing behavior in such a 
significant way as to impute direct infringement liability.164 District courts 
that have addressed this issue have held that providers whose systems are 
instrumental in allowing end-users to make infringing copies—and who 
profit from encouraging these third-party users to engage in this conduct—
are liable for direct copyright infringement.165 In such instances, the focus 
shifted away from the passivity of the systems. Instead, the determination of 
culpability was made by primarily examining whether the defendants had 
control over the content of information provided to its subscribers and 
whether the defendants developed these systems to commercially profit off 
of this infringing third-party behavior.166 For example, in Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.,167 the District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas held that where the defendant, a website operator, 
“exercised total dominion over the content of its site and the product it 
offered its clientele”168 and “developed and launched the . . . software for 
commercial use,”169 it could not evade liability for direct infringement by 
claiming that it was merely a passive conduit that automatically responded 
to the requests of users.170 By establishing a business model based around 
providing systems that enable third-party infringement while controlling the 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133 (stating that although case law exists supporting the 
argument, there are no binding cases requiring the Second Circuit to find that facilitating copying 
in such a major way as the RS-DVR service should impute direct copyright infringement). 
 159. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368–1370 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 160. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 
1997); Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp at 552. 
 161. See discussion on RS-DVR operation supra Part I.B. 
 162. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138–40. 
 163. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
 164. Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 511. 
 165. See Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 552; Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513. 
 166. See Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 552; Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 512–15. 
 167. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543. 
 168. Id. at 552. 
 169. Id. at 553. 
 170. Id. 
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digital content provided, an entity effectively becomes an infringing 
volitional actor. 
In the same way, Cablevision’s development of an RS-DVR system 
that utilizes buffers to create unauthorized copies of copyrighted content 
licensed solely for instantaneous linear network programming171 should 
preclude its ability to evade direct infringement liability. However, in 
hearing the case on appeal, the Second Circuit gave short shrift172 to the 
finding of the District Court for the Southern District of New York that the 
RS-DVR system in fact provides sufficiently significant involvement in the 
end-users’ requests to record copies to hold Cablevision liable for the 
plaintiffs’ claims.173 The appellate court condoned the use of technologies 
such as the buffer system used in the Arroyo Server which serve no other 
practical purpose than as a necessary step in the process of infringement.174 
Properly interpreted, development of these systems interferes with 
copyright holders’ exclusive rights175 to reproduce and authorize 
reproduction of their copyrighted works.176 The consequences of this ill-
reasoned decision could bleed into the judicial interpretation of future 
copyright cases177 where analogous technology blurs the line as to where 
volitional conduct takes place, and whether direct liability should attach to 
end users or with those entities that offer these copying services. 
IV. SCREEN-SCRAPING 
The outcome of this case may have a considerable impact on future 
judicial determinations regarding a number of potentially infringing 
technologies. This shift in viewpoint will likely affect those digital 
technologies that utilize buffers,178 as well as those designed as tools to aid 
infringing behavior.179 The nexus between the Second Circuit’s view of 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See explanation supra Part I.A–B. 
 172. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 173. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 621 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. 
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operated a system that splits data through the use of buffers. Id. at 619. This process required 
reconfiguration of the linear channel programming signals through the use of equipment 
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company maintained control over source programming and individual subscriber hard drive 
capacity, it is easy to see how Cablevision may be viewed as the proper defendant here for 
producing unauthorized copies. Id. 
 174. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139–40. 
 175. Twentieth Century, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
 176. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
 177. See generally Cavender, supra note 100, at 153–60. 
 178. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 179. See supra Part III.C–D. 
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buffers as transitory and non-infringing in nature,180 and the court’s 
dismissal of prior persuasive jurisprudence (that would otherwise impose 
liability for direct infringement on systems dedicated to facilitating the 
unauthorized copying of works)181 may also have significant consequences 
in the area of screen-scraping.182 Programmers who write screen-scraping 
applications may incorporate buffering and quick cache183 flushing into 
their programs in order to avoid copyright infringement claims.184 This may 
consequently encourage those who initiate such programs to engage in 
unethical practices by reducing the risk of liability. In order to understand 
how the Second Circuit’s view of the nature of buffer technology may 
result in an evasion of important copyright principles and potentially 
promote unethical behavior, it is important to first get a working knowledge 
of what this practice entails. 
“Screen-scraping” occurs when software developers and data 
aggregators employ the use of programs that rove the Internet and 
programmatically evaluate digitally displayed information in order to 
extract from it the specific information the user requests.185 These screen-
scraping or “spidering programs” are programmed to automatically collect 
information contained on websites, so that large amounts of data can be 
sifted through, thus “saving [users] the trouble of having to browse it all 
manually.”186 Although there is a distinction between “spiders” (which rove 
and collect entire web pages or files) and “scrapers” (which collect specific 
pieces of information from within these files), for purposes of this note, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 181. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV. 
 182. See discussion infra Part V. 
 183. Cache (“[p]ronounced ‘cash’”) is 
used to speed up data transfer and may be either temporary or permanent. 
Memory and disk caches are in every computer to speed up instruction 
execution and data retrieval and updating. These temporary caches serve as 
staging areas, and their contents are constantly changing. Browser caches and 
Internet caches store copies of Web pages retrieved by the user for some 
period of time in order to speed up retrieval the next time the same page is 
requested. 
PCMag.com, Encyclopedia Definition of: Cache, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/ 
0,2542,t=cache&i=39177,00.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 184. Eric Goldman Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/ 
derivative_liability/ (Aug. 4, 2008, 06:59 PST). 
 185. Robert Hess, Web Q&A: Printing from a Web Page, Screen Scraping, Origin of an HTTP 
Request, and More, MSDN MAG., http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc302055.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 186. These screen-scraping spiders “range in complexity from the simplest script to grab the 
latest weather information from a web page, to the armies of complex spiders working in concert 
with one another, searching, cataloging, and indexing the Web’s more than three billion resources 
for a search engine like Google.” KEVIN HEMENWAY & TARA CALISHAIN, SPIDERING HACKS: 
100 INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH TIPS & TOOLS xv (Rael Dornfest & Dale Dougherty eds., 2004). 
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these terms will be used interchangeably.187 These types of processes are 
usually employed in concert.188 Programmers often unleash “a program that 
uses a spider to follow links but then uses a scraper to gather particular 
information.”189 
A. THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE TYPE OF DATA EXTRACTED BY 
SCREEN-SCRAPERS AND THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
AFFORDED 
Screen-scraping practices, by their very nature, are often viewed as 
intrusive.190 Since scraping often involves one business actor’s process of 
data aggregation from information acquired on another entity’s website, 
disputes involving this practice “tend to involve commercial access of a 
website for profit and to the commercial detriment of the website owner.”191 
The required data may be copyrighted material embedded in a page,192 but 
often the digital data desired for commercial purposes is comprised of facts 
and information gleaned from a company’s pricing structure or stored 
database.193 Although those employing the scraped data may simply want to 
gain an edge in collecting stock information, researching real estate listings, 
or tracking insurance prices, owners of the websites being scraped often do 
not want their information being aggregated by an outside user even when 
the website and information are made public.194 However, if “[c]ompanies 
usually go to great lengths to disseminate information about their products 
or services. . . . [W]hy would a website owner not wish to have his or her 
website’s information scraped?”195 
A simple, but perhaps overlooked, response to this question is that 
some view aggregation of their data as unethical since they invested the 
time and cost to put together this information in the first place.196 As the 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. at 2. 
 188. Id. 
 189. While spider programs generally follow a series of Internet links, gathering up content, 
scrapers will instead pull data directly from web pages. Id. 
 190. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
 191. George Fibbe, Associate, Yetter, Warden & Coleman L.L.P., Speaker at the Mercer Law 
Review Symposium: The Internet: Place, Property, or Thing—All or None of the Above (Oct. 30, 
2003), in 55 MERCER L. REV. 919, 921 (2004). 
 192. Lauren Yamamoto, Note, Copyright Protection and Internet Fan Sites: Entertainment 
Industry Finds Solace in Traditional Copyright Law, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 95, 124 (2000) 
(discussing the licensee’s or copyright holder’s use of embedding to prevent unwanted access to 
copyrighted material). 
 193. Ryan Smith, Screen-scraping Ethics: The Ethics of Website-data Extraction, ASSOCIATED 
CONTENT, Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/932829/screenscraping_ethics. 
html?page=3&cat=15. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (acknowledging that 
while the result of data aggregation is not ultimately unfair, it may seem to the plaintiff that this 
practice is somewhat unethical). 
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Supreme Court recognized in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., Inc., “[i]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the 
compiler’s labor may be used by others without compensation.”197 These 
sentiments may not be unwarranted. For example, when airline flight prices 
are scraped via spidering software by a price comparison website, the target 
airline may accurately observe that a user of screen-scraping programs 
interferes with the relationship between the airline and their customers by 
inflating their flight prices and charging the customer an additional 
unjustified service fee.198 However, in Feist, the Supreme Court decided 
that facts themselves are not copyrightable, and the primary objective of 
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”199 per the Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.200 In doing so, the Feist Court ruled that the plaintiff’s 
substantial efforts and investments in compiling an alphabetized white 
pages telephone directory database would be afforded no remedy under the 
Copyright Act for the defendant competitor company’s appropriation of this 
data.201 Since public websites often only display factual data, it follows that 
facts and information located on public websites which are collected 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. 
 198. Shoosmiths, How to Stop Your Website Being ‘Screen Scraped,’ Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://www.shoosmiths.co.uk/news/1525.asp. The target airline 
may also claim that websites using screen scrapers fail to pass on important 
flight information, such as cancellations and delays, to customers after the 
booking has been made and slow down the airline’s own transactional 
website. This has led to a spate of disputes between the airlines and websites 
using screen scraping. 
Id. These practices, caused by the scraping site’s detachment from the target airline’s actual 
services, may subtract from the value of the airline’s service by negatively affecting the 
customer’s experience. Id. By gleaning the flight information, daily pricing, and other fare data 
from an airline’s online booking site, those parties utilizing screen-scrapers and offering tickets 
through their sites are unjustly building a business model around “shopping . . . fares for their 
[own] businesses.” E. Alan Arnold, Senior Attorney, Delta Airlines, Speaker at the Mercer Law 
Review Symposium: The Internet: Place, Property, or Thing—All or None of the Above (Oct. 30, 
2003), in 55 MERCER L. REV. 919, 944 (2004). 
 199. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (alteration in original). 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 201. Philip J. Cardinale, Sui Generis Database Protection: Second Thoughts in the European 
Union and What it Means for the United States, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 157, 159–60 
(2007), available at http://jip.kentlaw.edu/art/volume%206/6%20Chi-Kent%20J%20Intell%20 
Prop%20157.pdf. Cardinale added that the Supreme Court rejected the long-standing “sweat of 
the brow” doctrine by 
primarily us[ing] language from the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976 to 
locate an originality requirement in the Constitution’s intellectual property 
clause. In doing so, [the Court] jettisoned labor theories that were 
traditionally sufficient in many jurisdictions to uphold copyrights for items 
such as scaled reproductions of statues and bingo cards. 
Id. at 159–60. 
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through the use of a screen-scraping program would also not result in the 
spider programmer incurring liability for direct copyright infringement. 
B. SCREEN-SCRAPING “UNETHICS” 
The United States judicature has asserted the meager copyrightability of 
factual works and information by “appl[ying] Feist with a reasonable 
degree of consistency since 1991.”202 As a result, those seeking to protect 
the product of their invested time and effort, embodied in factual data, will 
find little help in the provisions of the Copyright Act.203 Commercial 
website owners attempting to block the activity of screen-scrapers and 
content aggregation programs have similarly been unsuccessful in litigating 
these issues under a copyright infringement theory.204 However, just 
because employing data aggregation spider programs have not typically 
been deemed illegal under copyright law does not mean that this practice is 
ethical.205 These target companies, whose data and information are being 
scraped, are joined in their opposition by many judicial decisions and 
legislative actions that recognize the harms that this usurpation can cause.206 
The court’s general animus toward screen-scraping practices can be 
seen in its willingness to extend jurisprudential limits to accommodate 
claims against defendant developers and employers of data aggregation 
programs. While commercial data systems can no longer be protected from 
unauthorized data aggregation practices by relying solely on the 
copyrightability of facts, courts have not been very sympathetic to those 
who screen-scrape competing companies’ websites.207 As a result, courts 
often allow plaintiffs to proceed with charges on theories other than 
copyright infringement,208 namely trespass-to-chattels claims209 and alleged 
                                                                                                                 
 202. David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and 
Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 130 (2007). 
 203. See Cardinale, supra note 201. 
 204. See Linda A. Goldstein, 25th Annual Institute on Computer & Internet Law – Online 
Advertising: Rules of the Net, in 25th ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, at 
291, 333–37 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series 
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action where copyright infringement claims failed). 
 205. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Brian Carver, Screen-Scraping: How to Use a Bot and Not Get Busted, INTELL. PROP. 
BULL. (Fenwick & West, L.L.P., Mountain View, Cal.), Fall 2007, at 4. 
 208. See Goldstein, supra note 204, at 332–33. 
 209. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Farechase, Inc., Cause No. 067-194022-02, 2–4 (Dist. 
Ct. Tex. Mar. 8, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/AA_v_FareChase/20030310_ 
prelim_inj.pdf (granting an injunction in part on a trespass-to-chattels theory, noting an 
infringement on server capacity and potential harm caused to customer goodwill through the use 
of a scraper program that gleaned web-fare information and undermined plaintiff’s distribution 
model); Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (allowing Oyster’s trespass-to-chattels claim to proceed to trial for 
defendant’s unauthorized use of plaintiff’s computer system); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071–73 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (issuing a preliminary injunction based on 
162 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
violations of a website’s terms of use.210 Defendants who utilize spidering 
programs against competitors very frequently incur liability, “especially 
where the site has posted terms of use prohibiting commercial use of the 
site’s content.”211 Courts’ eagerness to punish screen-scraping through a 
number of imperfect causes of action serves as evidence of the judiciary’s 
normative view that this practice inherently violates ethical standards. 
Many proposed and enacted pieces of legislation also seem to coincide 
with or embody a disdain for these unethical scraping practices. Website 
owners often rely on the anti-circumvention measures contained in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the DMCA)212 to thwart would-be 
appropriators of data by utilizing “self-help” technological protection 
measures, such as encryption, digital watermarks,213 password protection,214 
and the embedding of data within a copyrighted page.215 The provisions of 
the DMCA protect those that employ these self-help measures by finding 
violations where persons utilize or profit from programs “primarily 
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work”216 or those 
programs that have “only limited commercially significant purpose . . . 
other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a [copyrighted] work.”217 In other words, where owners of 
                                                                                                                 
damages caused by lost server capacity on a trespass-to-chattels theory for employment of a data-
aggregation bot unleashed on plaintiff’s website); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 
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and included allegations of additional torts. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
459, 470 (2006). 
 211. See Carver, supra note 207, at 3. This tendency toward liability extends beyond 
misappropriators of copyrighted works: “[D]ata aggregators that ultimately direct traffic and sales 
to the originating sites have found themselves losing in court.” Id. 
 212. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 213. Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917, 922–27 (2006). 
 214. See Yamamoto, supra note 192, at 121 n.256. 
 215. Id. 
 216. § 1201(a)(2)(A). 
 217. § 1201(a)(2)(B). 
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copyrighted materials have set up technological barriers to digitally 
accessing their work product, one may not provide or use a screen-scraping 
service whose main purpose is to get around these barriers either to gain 
access to the copyrighted material or profit from it .218 While the main thrust 
of the DMCA’s enactment was to afford added protection to the creativity 
of artistic works,219 the recognition of the need to promote innovation in the 
digital medium220 supports the peripheral effect of chilling efforts to 
aggregate data contained in copyrighted pages. 
In addition, many legislators have addressed the lack of fairness and 
reduced commercial development incentive that the practice of 
unauthorized information aggregation may cause.221 From 1996 to 2007, 
there were six database protection bills introduced.222 Two were passed by a 
House of Representatives vote (although eventually shelved by the Senate) 
and an additional two were approved by the standing House Judicial 
Committees.223 The introduction of these bills signifies the legislature’s 
awareness of the importance of the electronic database industry and its 
increasing vulnerability to unscrupulous practices.224 However, since the 
intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution225 was interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in Feist as requiring “originality,”226 bills that would 
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3872, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 224. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-421, pt. 1, at 7–9 (2004). The report stated: 
In cyberspace, technological developments represent a threat as well as an 
opportunity for collections of information, just as for other works. Copying 
factual material from a third party’s collection and rearranging it to form a 
competing information product—behavior that copyright protection alone 
may not effectively prevent—is cheaper and easier than ever through digital 
technology that is now in widespread use. 
Id. at 8. 
 225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 226. See supra Part IV.A. 
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effectively prohibit the use of spidering programs to aggregate data without 
the target company’s permission must be able to “withstand judicial 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause . . . [by] fram[ing] database protection 
proposals as a matter of protecting commercial interests, via unfair 
competition and misappropriation doctrines, rather than [intellectual] 
property.”227 Thus, the continued goal of protective legislation has been 
framed as an effort to protect the economic interests of principal companies 
from unfair competition,228 rather than ensuring the exclusive control of 
creative work product afforded to artists and inventors.229 This 
acknowledgement of the need to safeguard against potential economic 
harm230 reinforces the categorization of screen-scraping and data 
misappropriation as unethical practices. 
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PROMOTION OF SCREEN-
SCRAPING PRACTICES AND THE NEED TO REEL IN THE 
NON-INFRINGING STATUS OF BUFFERS 
The unethical behavior of screen-scraping will likely increase after 
programmers latch on to the possible defenses to copyright infringement 
arising from the Cartoon Network decision. One of the most important 
principles to emerge from Cartoon Network is the notion that loading a 
program into a form of RAM does not necessarily constitute an 
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a database is cheap, particularly when digital technology can automate the 
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Charles C. Huse, Database Protection in Theory and Practice: Three Recent Cases, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 23, 33 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
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unauthorized copy, as a matter of law.231 Prior to the Second Circuit’s 
decision, the controlling legal principle used to determine whether RAM 
constitutes a statutorily defined “copy” was found in MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc.232 The Second Circuit distinguished this case by 
declaring that the MAI decision failed to address the “transitory duration” 
requirement in determining whether a copy is “fixed.”233 Thus, a ruling was 
made on how the statute should be interpreted––free from stare decisis.234 
The conclusion reached by the appellate court was that even if an entire 
work is put through a buffer, as long as these small increments of data are 
overwritten quickly, no direct copyright infringement has occurred.235 
The Second Circuit’s ruling in this case will encourage the proliferation 
of unethical screen-scraping practices by allowing potential defendants to 
use buffers to procure information contained in copyrighted websites and 
databases. Those seeking to engage in this web activity can sidestep 
liability for direct copyright infringement by downloading a copyrighted 
page, processing the data, and then overwriting or eliminating the copies.236 
In redefining the process of reproducing copyrighted material and quickly 
overwriting the data obtained as “non-infringing conduct,”237 the court has 
provided users of scraping robots with a possible mechanism for letting the 
uncopyrightable “ends” excuse the “means.”238 More simply, as long as a 
scraper can sift the uncopyrightable facts from the copyrighted material 
quickly enough that a court would deem it “transitory” (for example, a 
buffer), the user gets to keep all the uncopyrighted data to utilize for her 
own financial gain.239 
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Without this crucial layer of protection, financial actors may find it 
more difficult to secure profitability, resulting in a diminished incentive to 
invest in innovation and provide a public good.240 In the same way that the 
driving force behind copyright innovation is the desire for economic gain, 
which in turn produces a public good,241 firms are likewise motivated to 
gather and utilize data based upon a desire for profit.242 As digital 
communication systems expand and “the economic value of online 
databases increases, so too does the potential market harm wrought by 
database security breaches.”243 Thus, there is a great need to mitigate the 
financial harm that might result from excusing buffered screen-scraping, 
since the digital age has extended this market far into the global arena.244 
Screen-scraping practices may also be encouraged by the Second 
Circuit’s unwillingness to attach liability to digital services that construct 
their business models around employing buffers that serve the sole purpose 
of facilitating copyright infringement.245 For example, assume that a 
spidering program is integrated into a scraper’s service, allowing third-party 
end-users to provide the requisite “volitional conduct” for copyright 
infringement to attach where copyrighted pages are downloaded to extract 
information (for example, by initiating an unauthorized search for 
corporations that use a specific phone company). If this bot246 uses buffers 
to quickly overwrite all copyrighted portions of the data stream, even where 
the data stream transmits the “embodiment”247 of the entire copyrighted 
webpage bit by bit, the Cartoon Network court would likely forgive the 
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intrusive process as creating a non-infringing copy.248 However, even if the 
court did find that a fixed copy had been made, under the same erroneous 
buffer logic that exculpated Cablevision from liability, employers of the 
buffered screen-scraping program would not have committed the volitional 
conduct necessary to be labeled as direct copyright infringers.249 By 
applying the court’s reasoning and viewing the providers of buffered 
screen-scraping services as passive non-volitional actors, there will be little 
stopping the emboldened programmers of spidering bots from engaging in 
this harmful behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit erred in giving a broad and sweeping pardon for 
direct copyright infringement both to creators of unauthorized “transitory” 
copies and to those who maintain and produce systems that are dedicated to 
infringement-facilitating practices. While there certainly will be harm to the 
U.S. business sector, it remains to be seen how much damage the fallout 
from this decision will cause to society at large. It would be prudent for 
other courts to avoid this short-sighted jurisprudence. 
The appellate court’s adjudication opened the door for Cablevision’s 
new consumer-friendly technology, but its lasting declarations continue to 
leave the door unlocked for more sinister bots and spiders to be unleashed 
on future commercial innovators.250 In allowing buffers to get around the 
“transitory duration” requirement for direct infringement, devisors of 
screen-scraping programs are given the key to practicing unauthorized and 
unethical data aggregation with few consequences. With an increasing need 
for protective legislation perhaps far on the horizon,251 courts need to 
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